People in one society sometimes make moral judgments about people in another society on the basis of moral standards they take to be authoritative for both societies. In addition, conflicts between societies are sometimes resolved because one society changes its moral outlook and comes to share at least some of the moral values of the other society.
More generally, sometimes people in one society think they learn from the moral values of another society: They come to believe that the moral values of another society are better in some respects than their own previously accepted values.
The Mondrian image of a world divided into distinct societies, each with it own distinctive moral values, makes it difficult to account for these considerations. If this image is abandoned as unrealistic, and is replaced by one that acknowledges greater moral overlap and interaction among societies recall the Pollock image , then the proponent of MMR needs to give a plausible account of these dynamics.
This is related to the problem of authority raised earlier: These considerations suggest that people sometimes acknowledge moral authority that extends beyond their own society, and a relativist needs to show why this makes sense or why people are mistaken in this acknowledgement.
Discussions of moral relativism often assume as mostly has been assumed here so far that moral relativism is the correct account of all moral judgments or of none. On the empirical level, it might be thought that there are many substantial moral disagreements but also some striking moral agreements across different societies.
On the metaethical plane, it might be supposed that, though many disagreements are not likely to be rationally resolved, other disagreements may be and perhaps that the cross-cultural agreements we find have a rational basis.
The first point would lead to a weaker form of DMR The second point, the more important one, would imply a modified form of MMR see the suggestions in the last paragraph of section 4. This approach has attracted some support, interestingly, from both sides of the debate: relativists who have embraced an objective constraint, and more commonly objectivists who have allowed some relativist dimensions.
Here are some prominent examples of these mixed metaethical outlooks. David Copp maintains that it is true that something is morally wrong only if it is wrong in relation to the justified moral code of some society, and a code is justified in a society only if the society would be rationally required to select it.
Since which code it would be rationally required to select depends in part on the non-moral values of the society, and since these values differ from one society to another, something may be morally wrong for one society but not for another. Copp calls this position a form of moral relativism. However, he believes this relativism is significantly mitigated by the fact that which code a society is rationally required to select also depends on the basic needs of the society.
Copp thinks all societies have the same basic needs. For example, every society has a need to maintain its population and system of cooperation from one generation to the next.
Moreover, since meeting these basic needs is the most fundamental factor in determining the rationality of selecting a code, Copp thinks the content of all justified moral codes will tend to be quite similar. The theory is mixed insofar as the rationality of selecting a code depends partly on common features of human nature basic needs and partly on diverse features of different societies values.
Whether or not justified moral codes and hence moral truths would tend to be substantially similar, despite differences, as Copp argues, would depend on both the claim that all societies have the same basic needs and the claim that these needs are much more important than other values in determining which moral code it is rational for a society to select.
Wong defended a partly similar position, though one intended to allow for greater diversity in correct moral codes. He argued that more than one morality may be true, but there are limits on which moralities are true. The first point is a form of metaethical relativism: It says one morality may be true for one society and a conflicting morality may be true for another society.
Hence, there is no one objectively correct morality for all societies. The second point, however, is a concession to moral objectivism. It acknowledges that objective factors concerning human nature and the human situation should determine whether or not, or to what extent, a given morality could be one of the true ones. The mere fact that a morality is accepted by a society does not guarantee that it has normative authority in that society.
For example, given our biological and psychological make-up, not just anything could count as a good way of life. Again, given that most persons are somewhat self-interested and that society requires some measure of cooperation, any plausible morality will include a value of reciprocity good in return for good on some proportional basis. Since these objective limitations are quite broad, they are insufficient in themselves to establish a specific and detailed morality: Many particular moralities are consistent with them, and the choice among these moralities must be determined by the cultures of different societies.
Wong has developed this approach at length in more recent work The constraints are based on a naturalistic understanding of human nature and the circumstances of human life.
In addition, morality requires that persons have both effective agency and effective identity, and these can only be fostered in personal contexts such as the family. Hence, the impersonal perspective must be limited by the personal perspective. Any true morality would have to respect requirements such as these. Nonetheless, according to Wong, the universal constraints are sufficiently open-ended that there is more than one way to respect them.
Hence, there can be more than one true morality. This is pluralistic relativism. For Wong, the different true moralities need not be, and typically are not, completely different from one another. In fact, they often share some values such as individual rights and social utility , but assign them different priorities. The extent to which moral ambivalence is widespread is an empirical question see section 3.
In any case, Wong presents a sustained and detailed argument that an empirically-based understanding of the nature and conditions of human life both limits and underdetermines what a true morality could be. In many respects, his position is the most sophisticated form of relativism developed to date, and it has the resources to confront a number of the issues raised in the last section for some critical responses to Wong and his replies, see Xiao and Huang ; for more recent discussion, see Li , Vicente and Arrieta , and Wong A somewhat similar mixed position has been advanced, though more tentatively, by Foot a and b; see also Scanlon and ch.
She argued that there are conceptual limitations on what could count as a moral code as seen in section 4 , and that there are common features of human nature that set limits on what a good life could be. For these reasons, there are some objective moral truths—for example, that the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews was morally wrong. However, Foot maintained, these considerations do not ensure that all moral disagreements can be rationally resolved. Hence, in some cases, a moral judgment may be true by reference to the standards of one society and false by reference to the standards of another society—but neither true nor false in any absolute sense just as we might say with respect to standards of beauty.
Foot came to this mixed view from the direction of objectivism in the form of a virtue theory , and it might be contended by some objectivists that she has conceded too much. Since there are objective criteria, what appear as rationally irresolvable disagreements might be resolvable through greater understanding of human nature.
Or the objective criteria might establish that in some limited cases it is an objective moral truth that conflicting moral practices are both morally permissible.
In view of such considerations, objectivists might argue, it is not necessary to have recourse to the otherwise problematic notion of relative moral truth. With explicit reference to Aristotle, she argued that there is one objectively correct understanding of the human good, and that this understanding provides a basis for criticizing the moral traditions of different societies.
The specifics of this account are explained by a set of experiences or concerns, said to be common to all human beings and societies, such as fear, bodily appetite, distribution of resources, management of personal property, etc.
Corresponding to each of these is a conception of living well, a virtue, namely the familiar Aristotelian virtues such as courage, moderation, justice, and generosity. Nussbaum acknowledged that there are disagreements about these virtues, and she raised an obvious relativist objection herself: Even if the experiences are universal, does human nature establish that there is one objectively correct way of living well with respect to each of these areas?
In response, Nussbaum conceded that sometimes there may be more than one objectively correct conception of these virtues and that the specification of the conception may depend on the practices of a particular community. As with Foot, Nussbaum came to this mixed position from the objectivist side of the debate. Some moral objectivists may think she has given up too much, and for a related reason many moral relativists may believe she has established rather little. For example, bodily appetites are indeed universal experiences, but there has been a wide range of responses to these—for example, across a spectrum from asceticism to hedonism.
This appears to be one of the central areas of moral disagreement. In order to maintain her objectivist credentials, Nussbaum needs to show that human nature substantially constrains which of these responses could be morally appropriate. Some objectivists may say she has not shown this, but could, while relativists may doubt she could show it. Mixed positions along the lines of those just discussed suppose that morality is objective in some respects, on account of some features of human nature, and relative in other respects.
For the respects in which morality is relative, it is up to particular societies or individuals to determine which moral values to embrace. Hence, the authority of morality depends partly on objective factors and partly on the decisions of groups or individuals. Insofar as this is true, such mixed positions need to say something about the basis for these decisions and how conflicts are to be resolved for example, when individuals dissent from groups or when people belong to different groups with conflicting values.
The objective features of mixed positions may help resolve these issues, or may limit their import, but at the point where these features give out there remain some of the standard concerns about relativism such as those raised in the last section. Another approach might be construed as a mixed position, though it was not put forward in these terms. Isaiah Berlin argued that, though some moral values are universal, there are also many objective values that conflict and are not commensurable with one another.
But if incommensurability implies that these conflicts cannot be rationally resolved, then it might suggest a concession to relativism. Finally, it should also be noted that a rather different kind of mixed position was proposed by Bernard Williams and ch. But he endorsed another form of relativism. For example, we could never embrace the outlook of a medieval samurai: Since this is a notional confrontation, it would be inappropriate to describe this outlook as just or unjust.
This is the sense in which relativism is correct. Williams was a strong critic of most forms of moral objectivism, yet he also criticized many of the nonobjectivist alternatives to objectivism. His outlook is not easily classified in terms of standard metaethical positions.
With respect to his relativism of distance, it may be wondered why appraisals are inappropriate in notional confrontations: Why should the fact that an outlook is not a real option preclude us from thinking it is just or unjust? On the other hand, in real confrontations Williams thought the language of appraisal was appropriate, but he also thought these confrontations could involve rationally irresolvable disagreements.
Though Williams rejects strict relational relativism, objectivists may argue that his position suffers from defects as serious as those that attend MMR. If the confrontations are real because the two outlooks have something in common, objectivists might ask, could this not provide a basis for resolving these disagreements?
The central theme in mixed positions is that neither relativism nor objectivism is wholly correct: At least in the terms in which they are often expressed, these alternatives are subject to serious objections, and yet they are motivated by genuine concerns.
It might seem that a mixed position could be developed that would give us the best of both worlds there are a number of other proposals along these lines; for example see Hampshire and However, an implication of most mixed positions this does not apply to Williams seems to be that, in some respect, some moral judgments are objectively true or justified , while others have only relative truth or justification.
This should not be confused with the claim that an action may be right in some circumstances but not others. This is a rather disunified conception of morality, and it invites many questions. A proponent of a mixed view would have to show that it is an accurate portrayal of our moral practices, or that it is a plausible proposal for reforming them.
Relativism is sometimes associated with a normative position, usually pertaining to how people ought to regard or behave towards those with whom they morally disagree. The most prominent normative position in this connection concerns tolerance. In recent years, the idea that we should be tolerant has been increasingly accepted in some circles. At the same time, others have challenged this idea, and the philosophical understanding and justification of tolerance has become less obvious see Heyd and the entry on toleration.
The question here is whether moral relativism has something to contribute to these discussions, in particular, whether DMR or MMR provide support for tolerance for discussion, see Graham , Harrison , Ivanhoe , Kim and Wreen , Prinz pp. In this context, tolerance does not ordinarily mean indifference or absence of disapproval: It means having a policy of not interfering with the actions of persons that are based on moral judgments we reject, when the disagreement is not or cannot be rationally resolved.
The context of discussion is often, but not always, moral disagreements between two societies. Does moral relativism provide support for tolerance in this sense?
Though many people seem to think it does, philosophers often resist supposing that there is a philosophical connection between accepting a metaethical position and reaching a practical conclusion however, see Gillespie Hence, it is often thought that, though DMR may provide the occasion for tolerance, but it could not imply that tolerance is morally obligatory or even permissible.
DMR simply tells us there are moral disagreements. Recognition of this fact, by itself, entails nothing about how we should act towards those with whom we disagree. MMR fares no better. For one thing, MMR cannot very well imply that it is an objective moral truth that we should be tolerant: MMR denies that there are such truths. A mixed position could contend that tolerance is the only objective moral truth, all others being relative; but it would have to be shown that this is more than an ad hoc maneuver.
It might be said that MMR implies that tolerance is a relative truth. However, even this is problematic. According to MMR , understood to concern truth, the truth-value of statements may vary from society to society.
MMR by itself does not entail that T is true in any society, and may in fact have the result that T is false in some societies a similar point may be made with respect to justification. Some objectivists may add that in some cases we should be tolerant of those with whom we morally disagree, but that only objectivists can establish this as an objective moral truth for example, by drawing on arguments in the liberal tradition from Locke or Mill.
To the objection that moral objectivism implies intolerance or imperialism , objectivists typically contend that the fact that we regard a society as morally wrong in some respect does not entail that we should interfere with it. Nonetheless, the thought persists among some relativists that there is a philosophically significant connection between relativism and tolerance. Perhaps the conjunction of MMR and an ethical principle could give us a reason for tolerance we would not have on the basis of the ethical principle alone.
Such an approach has been proposed by Wong ch. The principle is, roughly speaking, that we should not interfere with people unless we could justify this interference to them if they were rational and well-informed in relevant respects. The idea is that it gains broader scope if MMR is correct. Let us suppose the statement that there is an individual right to freedom of speech is true and justified for our society, but is false and unjustified in another society in which the press is restricted for the good of the community.
In this case, given MMR , our society might not be able to justify interference to the restrictive society concerning freedom of the press. Any justification we could give would appeal to values that are authoritative for us, not them, and no appeal to logic or facts alone would give them a reason to accept our justification.
If the justification principle were widely accepted, this argument might explain why some people have had good reason to think there is a connection between relativism and tolerance.
But there is a question about whether the position is stable. If we were to accept MMR , would we still have reason to accept the justification principle? Wong thought we might, perhaps on the basis of considerations quite independent of Kant. In any case, this argument would only show that MMR plays a role in an argument for tolerance that is relevant to people in a society that accepted the justification principle.
The argument does not establish that there is a general connection between relativism and tolerance. Nor does it undermine the contention that MMR may have the result that T is true in some societies and false in others.
In his more recent defense of pluralistic relativism , Wong has argued that, since some serious moral disagreements are inevitable, any adequate morality will include the value of what he calls accommodation.
This involves a commitment to peaceful and non-coercive relationships with persons with whom we disagree. Accommodation appears to be related to tolerance, but Wong argues for more than this: we should also try to learn from others, compromise with them, preserve relationships with them, etc. However, for this reason, though it presupposes the considerations supporting the relativist dimension of his position there is no single true morality , it argues from the non-relativist dimension there are universal constraints any morality should accept, in particular, that one function of morality is to promote social co-operation.
Hence, it is not strictly speaking an argument from relativism to accommodation. As was noted in section 3 , aside from the philosophical question whether or not some form of moral relativism provides a reason for attitudes such as tolerance, there is the psychological question whether or not people who accept relativism are more likely to be tolerant.
As was seen, there is some evidence that relativists are more tolerant than objectivists, and it has been claimed that, even if relativism does not justify tolerance, it would be a positive feature of relativism that acceptance of it makes people more tolerant see Prinz Of course, this judgment presupposes that, in some sense, it is good to be tolerant.
Historical Background 2. Forms and Arguments 3. Experimental Philosophy 4. Descriptive Moral Relativism 5. Are Moral Disagreements Rationally Resolvable? Metaethical Moral Relativism 7. Historical Background Though moral relativism did not become a prominent topic in philosophy or elsewhere until the twentieth century, it has ancient origins. As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be.
This point is typically made with respect to truth or justification or both , and the following definition will be a useful reference point: Metaethical Moral Relativism MMR. The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons. Experimental Philosophy Experimental philosophy is an approach to philosophy that explicitly draws on experimental knowledge established by the sciences to address philosophical questions see the entry on experimental moral philosophy.
Metaethical Moral Relativism Even if it were established that there are deep and widespread moral disagreements that cannot be rationally resolved, and that these disagreements are more significant than whatever agreements there may be, it would not immediately follow that MMR is correct.
Relativism and Tolerance Relativism is sometimes associated with a normative position, usually pertaining to how people ought to regard or behave towards those with whom they morally disagree. Bibliography Accetti, C. Appiah, K. Audi, R. Ayars, A. Baghramian, M. Beebe, J. Sarkissian and J. Wright eds. Lombrozo, J. Knobe and S. Nichols eds. Benbaji, Y. Berlin, I. Hardy and R. Hausheer eds. Original Publication Date: Bilgrami, A.
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Oxford Studies in Metaethics , Vol. Earp, B. Egan, A. Elgin, C. Krausz ed. Evers, D. Feltz, A. Love, K. McRae and V. Sloutsky eds. Fisher, M. Fleischacker, S. Foot, P. Frick, M-L. Fricker, M. Crisp ed. Garcia, J. Geertz, C. Gewirth, A. Paul, F. Miller, Jr. Paul eds.
Gill, M. Gillespie, R. Goodwin, G. Gowans, C. Graham, G. Heyd ed. Hales, S. Hampshire, S. Hare, R. Harman, G. Harman and J. Thompson eds. Harrison, G. Hatch, E. Herskovits, M. Herskovits ed. Heyd, D. Perhaps what determines the relevant difference is an entirely mind-independent affair, making for an objectivist relativism. Suppose the moral facts depend on the attitudes or opinions of a particular group or individual e.
Since, in this case, all speakers' moral utterances are made true or false by the same mental activity, then this is not strictly speaking a version of relativism, but is, rather, a relation-designating account of moral terms see Stevenson 74 for this distinction.
The mind-dependence relation embodied in a subjectivist theory may give rise to a relation-designating account of moral truth rather than a relativistic account. Some people believe that morals are not universal and rather that the moral action depends on societal or individual opinions.
It is obvious that people and societies have different beliefs on what is right and what is wrong, but does that change what is moral? Therefore, the question is: Are there any moral truths that remain constant regardless of opinions? Ethical Objectivism is based on the belief that there are moral truths of the universe that.
It seems it conflicts violently with common sense realities of the moral life. However, there are some reasons one may accept relativism and it is because it is a comforting position. It would be unacceptable to the community because it would like to promote truthfulness and punishment of the law offenders. This decision also has to be evaluated on the basis of internal criteria. For the internal criteria, a person has to look inside oneself to evaluate the decision. Does the person feel satisfied with the decision and promote these values?
Secondly, he outlines the argument of a pro-choice advocate; which asserts that fetuses are not rational or social beings, therefore it is not a wrongful killing. From this point, Marquis attempts to outline common objections to anti-abortionism, and give replies in which may better support his view, by characterizing and defining situations which are commonly brought up in such arguments.
A pro-choicer would typically respond that it is only seriously wrong to take the life of another member of the human society, which refers to active members and social beings in a community. This leads to a point where it is commonly seen that anti-abortionists hold too narrow of a principle, while pro-choice views are too broad. I will start by introducing two famous arguments in favor of Moral Relativism and explain why they are flawed arguments. I will later address some problems with the theory itself.
I will begin to illustrate what Waldron means by such a right. It is suggested that an individual should not act in an immoral way but has the choice to do so. Waldron wishes to answer the inconsistencies in the paradox of the moral right to do wrong. Which is which? In the attempt to explain morality, two prominent theories exist- moral relativism and moral objectivism. Morality in a sense is difficult to explain, both theories attempt to shed a bit of light in way to break down its complexity.
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